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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2255 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
    
v. 
 
VICTOR PATELA 
 
    Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Case No. 11-cr-00491-1) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 27, 2014 
____________ 
 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 3, 2014) 
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____________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
A jury found Victor Patela guilty of five offenses relating to a 2004 scheme to 
fraudulently obtain a $1.9 million loan to purchase two apartment buildings. On appeal, 
Patela raises three issues and argues that each presents an independent ground to reverse 
his conviction. First, he argues that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting 
certain evidence of other acts. Second, he argues that the District Court failed to 
adequately remedy what the defense identified as “burden shifting” remarks by the 
prosecution. Third, he argues that the District Court erroneously instructed the jury on 
willful blindness. Considering each of these issues in turn, we find that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err. We therefore affirm. 
I. Facts 
Victor Patela and his friend, Jose Dominguez, sought to purchase two apartment 
buildings in Elizabeth, New Jersey valued at $1.9 million. Neither Patela, a police officer, 
nor Dominguez, a bank employee, had much money, so they hatched a plan to purchase 
the property with “zero money down.” App’x 461-62. 
The scheme hinged on Dominguez’s connection to his employer, Spencer Savings 
Bank. Knowing that the bank would only agree to eighty percent financing, Dominguez 
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colluded with the seller to falsely inflate the price of the apartment buildings so that 
eighty percent of the inflated price covered one hundred percent of the true price.  
Next, Dominguez had Patela form a limited liability company called “JVI Realty” and 
use it to apply for a mortgage loan with Spencer Savings Bank. The two deliberately 
concealed Dominguez’s involvement and financial stake in the deal. As part of the loan 
application, the bank requested a personal financial statement. Dominguez completed the 
form for Patela, overstating Patela’s assets by millions of dollars and exaggerating his 
experience as an owner of commercial real estate.  
Spencer Savings Bank also demanded “satisfactory evidence . . . as to the source of 
the $480,000 equity contribution” before it could approve the loan. Supplemental App’x 
45. Without any actual assets to speak of, Patela told the bank that he had contracted to 
sell a piece of property in Newark, NJ and that, when the deal closed, he would use the 
proceeds from that sale to pay the $480,000. In fact, Patela had already sold the same 
property in 2003. Nonetheless, Dominguez downloaded a blank real estate contract from 
the Internet and fabricated proof of the source of the equity contribution. The bank 
accepted their representations. 
Having allayed the bank’s concerns about JVI Realty’s ability to pay, Patela and 
Dominguez had to find a way to actually come up with the money. They did so in part by 
taking out a second mortgage on the apartment buildings. The second mortgage directly 
violated several clauses in the Spencer Savings Bank loan agreement that forbade further 
encumbrances on the properties. Unaware of the second mortgage, Spencer Savings Bank 
approved JVI Realty’s application for the $1.9 million loan, and Patela and Dominguez 
purchased the Elizabeth apartments.  
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In 2008, JVI Realty defaulted on its loan and subsequently filed for bankruptcy in 
federal court. While reviewing the loan documents, a Spencer Savings Bank officer 
noticed that the signatures of the two parties to the fake real estate contract looked 
suspiciously similar to one another. The bank officer confronted Patela, who agreed to 
surrender the deed to the Elizabeth properties to Spencer Savings Bank in lieu of 
foreclosure. The bank sold the Elizabeth properties for  a loss of more than $450,000.  
Federal agents arrested Patela and Dominguez for conspiring to commit bank fraud. 
Soon thereafter, a federal grand jury returned the indictment charging Patela with bank 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; loan application fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1014; and bank bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1). Patela pleaded not guilty 
on all counts and opted for a jury trial. After the six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty on all counts.  
II. Discussion 
On appeal, Patela raises three arguments: (1) the District Court erred in admitting 
certain character evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) at trial; (2) the District Court erred by 
failing to grant a mistrial in response to the “burden-shifting” remarks made by the 
government during its rebuttal summation; and (3) the District Court erred in charging 
the jury on willful blindness. For the reasons that follow, we reject each argument. 
A. Other bad acts evidence 
Patela contends that the District Court erroneously admitted other bad acts evidence 
against him. The government sought to admit evidence that Patela submitted false 
information on a 2007 residential loan application and had included false information in 
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JVI’s bankruptcy petition. The District Court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether 
this evidence was permissible under Rule 404(b) and concluded that it was. Patela objects 
to this conclusion and further argues that the prejudicial effect of the evidence 
outweighed any probative value in violation of Rule 403. “We normally review 
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, but we exercise plenary review over whether 
evidence falls within the scope of Rule 404(b).” United States v. Smith, 725 F.3d 340, 
344-45 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). 
“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s 
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 
with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). For a court confronted with other bad acts 
evidence, “[t]he prime inquiry is whether the evidence is probative of a material issue 
other than character.” United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 187 (3d Cir. 2002). Rule 
404(b)(2) permits other bad acts evidence when the proponent offers the evidence to 
prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident.” But “the proponents of Rule 404(b) evidence must do more 
than conjure up a proper purpose—they must also establish a chain of inferences no link 
of which is based on a propensity inference.” Smith, 725 F.3d at 345. 
The fact that Patela (1) committed mortgage loan fraud in 2007 and (2) made 
misrepresentations before the bankruptcy court in 2009 spoke to issues beyond Patela’s 
character. The evidence demonstrated his capacity to knowingly perpetrate fraud without 
assistance from or manipulation by Dominguez. Moreover, the evidence rebutted Patela’s 
claim of ignorance, and his claim that he lacked the sophistication to defraud Spencer 
Savings Bank. Patela repeatedly argued that Dominguez alone committed the fraud and 
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that Patela was an innocent dupe. The government presented the other bad acts evidence 
to cast doubt on those theories. Because other bad acts evidence may be admitted to rebut 
claims of ignorance, mistake, or lack of intent, such as Patela’s, we conclude that the 
District Court properly admitted the evidence. See Boone, 279 F.3d at 187. 
Alternatively, Patela argues that the District Court improperly balanced the probative 
value of the evidence against the risk of jury confusion and prejudice. Rule 403 instructs 
courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review a District Court’s Rule 403 decisions for abuse 
of discretion. United States v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 669 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
The District Court concluded that the evidence was “important to the Government’s 
proof” to show knowledge and intent, and that its “prejudicial effect or risk of confusion 
to the jury” was not significant. App’x 150. Given that we allow district courts 
particularly broad discretion when it comes to this “on-the-spot balancing of probative 
value and prejudice,” we accept the District Court’s considered balancing here. United 
States v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. 
Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008)). 
B. The government’s “burden-shifting” remarks 
Next, Patela argues that the District Court erred by failing to grant a mistrial to 
remedy any prejudicial effect of certain remarks made by the prosecutor during rebuttal 
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summation. As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree about whether Patela properly 
raised this issue before the District Court and, consequently, whether we must review for 
plain error. The confusion traces back to defense counsel’s objection to the government’s 
summation, which addressed the issue of a mistrial in noncommittal language: “I could 
be asking for a mistrial . . . and maybe I should have.” App’x 1037. We will assume 
without deciding that Patela did move for a mistrial and, thus, that we review the District 
Court’s denial for abuse of discretion. Applying that standard, we conclude that the 
District Court acted within its discretion when it denied a mistrial and responded with a 
curative jury instruction instead. 
To determine whether the District Court erred by failing to grant a mistrial, we look to 
“the scope of the improper comments in the overall trial context, the effect of any 
curative instructions given, and the strength of the evidence against the defendant.” 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 1999). “We review a district 
court’s decision not to grant a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor made improper 
remarks in closing argument for abuse of discretion, and, if error is found, we apply 
harmless error analysis.” United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 703 (3d Cir. 
1996) (citations omitted). 
The prosecutor made the first challenged remark in response to defense counsel’s 
summation argument that Patela’s 2007 residential mortgage fraud was irrelevant to the 
charges. He said, “So what does the defendant have to say about that?” App’x 1003. 
Taken out of context, the question might suggest that Patela owed the jury a response. 
The District Court, however, determined that the statement was made “in the context of 
8 
 
fair rebuttal.” App’x 1034. We agree. The prosecutor’s remark introduce his arguments 
about why the defense’s theory of innocent mistake could not be credited. App’x 1003. 
The second challenged remark had a similar purpose. The prosecutor said: 
The defendant was under oath during that [JVI Realty] bankruptcy 
proceeding. Did he mention Jose Dominguez at all? Did he mention him 
when he said that he took the second mortgage? Of course not. And that’s 
supposed to be evidence of the defendant’s innocence. Right? That years 
later in 2009, JVI plummets, falls apart, he files for bankruptcy, and 
because he identified the prohibited second mortgage on the petition, that 
that proves that he didn’t know anything was wrong with it[?] 
App’x 1004 (emphasis added). This statement followed defense counsel’s summation, 
during which she emphasized the fact that Patela was forthcoming about his second 
mortgage on the apartment buildings during the 2009 bankruptcy proceedings. She said: 
“If he committed a fraud, and he knew that he couldn’t let anyone know because the 
second mortgage was evidence of that fraud, why would he trade $300,000 to shed light 
on that fraud?” App’x 987. In other words, if Patela were guilty of fraud, he would not 
have revealed the unauthorized second mortgage because that violation is part of the 
fraudulent scheme. We construe the prosecutor’s remarks to address this assertion and 
not to imply that Patela had a burden to prove his innocence.  
In any event, the District Court addressed a jury instruction to remedy any confusion 
generated by the exchange:  
I want to note for you that during the government’s rebuttal, the 
government questioned whether certain evidence highlighted by the defense 
was, ‘supposed to be evidence of the defendant’s innocence.’ This 
statement should not be taken by you to suggest that the defendant has any 
burden to prove his innocence. As I have said, the burden to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt stays with the government throughout trial. 
9 
 
App’x 1065. The instruction emphasized that the burden of proof remained on the 
prosecution, not Patela, therefore eradicating any confusion on the matter. 
Considering the context of the remarks, the curative instruction, and the overall 
strength of the evidence tending toward Patela’s conviction, the District Court acted 
within its discretion when it rejected the mistrial motion. 
C. Willful blindness instruction 
Finally, Patela challenges the District Court’s decision to instruct the jury on the 
concept of willful blindness. “We review a district court’s determination that the trial 
evidence justified [a willful blindness] instruction for abuse of discretion.” United States 
v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). “The Government need not present 
direct evidence of conscious avoidance to justify a willful blindness instruction.” Id. at 
259 (emphasis in original). And “assuming there to be sufficient evidence as to both 
theories, it is not inconsistent for a court to give a charge on both willful blindness and 
actual knowledge.” United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 252 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The record developed at trial justified a jury instruction on willful blindness. Patela 
contended that he had no knowledge of the fraudulent representations made to the bank. 
At the same time, however, evidence showed that Patela signed certain loan documents 
that contained false information and that he knew those documents would be submitted to 
the bank. On the basis of this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Patela 
deliberately failed to review documents in order to distance himself from the fraud. 
Even if the District Court had improperly decided to instruct the jury on willful 
blindness, the error would have been harmless. Where there is substantial evidence 
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supporting a finding of actual knowledge, and “the instruction itself contain[s] the proper 
legal standard,” we find the error harmless. See, e.g., Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 260 n.26 
(quotation marks omitted). That would be the case here. Patela does not directly 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence proving his actual knowledge of the fraud, nor 
do we see any basis for such a challenge. 
III. Conclusion 
Having considered each of Patela’s arguments, we find that none merit reversal. The 
District Court correctly ruled to admit the other bad acts evidence, remedied any 
confusion caused by the government’s remarks made during the rebuttal summation, and 
acted within its discretion when it elected to instruct the jury on willful blindness. 
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
